INTRODUCTION
Antecedents of environmental proactivity are an increasingly important area of study for management scholars. In recent years, in fact, it has become evident that the success of a business is no longer defined only by monetary gains but also by the impact that the activities of an organization have on society as a whole. Achieving sustainability is, therefore, one of the most relevant challenges for society and firms.
In particular, companies may play a crucial role in order to reduce the global environmental impact of the present society (Carballo-Penela and Castromán-Diz, 2015); that's why the commitment to the natural environment has become an important variable within the current competitive scenarios (Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-Benito, 2006) and environmental performance is increasingly considered a strategic issue for firms. This is particularly true for firms belonging to polluting industries which are more and more forced to change their attitude towards green issues (Bansal, 2005; Sharma and Enriques, 2005) : the emerging consumers' preference for greener products and services, together with the pressure operated by stringent governmental regulations and by stakeholders (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006) and media are, in fact, requesting corporate managers to adopt better environmental behaviors (Kock et al., 2012) .
These behaviors, in particular, may range in a continuum between two extreme positions (Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-Benito, 2006): a passive, or reactive, strategy, by which companies decide to perform only the necessary actions in order to meet regulatory requirements; a proactive conduct, specific of firms that voluntary introduce policies and actions to prevent or decrease their impact on the natural environment.
As there is a growing evidence that a proactive environmental strategy may help firms to gain competitive advantage, such strategy, and in particular its drivers and impact on business performance, has been an object, in the last few years, of an ongoing debate (Russo and The Organizations and Natural Environment literature has, in fact, extensively developed on the drivers of firms' proactive environmental strategies, focusing on a variety of antecedents, such as: regulation (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008) , stakeholder pressure (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999), firm's ethical attitude (Bansal and Roth, 2000) , industry structure (Claver et al., 2007) , geographic location, company's size, its position in the value chain (Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-Benito, 2006) or the perception of new business opportunities (Bansal and Roth, 2000) . A few studies have recently explored the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on firms' environmental performance and proactivity (Berrone and Calza et al., 2016) , trying to understand if there are mechanisms that may influence managers towards green practices, but the relationship between corporate governance, in particular board structure and composition, and firms' environmental proactivity has not been sufficiently investigated and the debate is still open. The few studies on the issue have provided fragmented and contradictory empirical evidence that makes theory building difficult (Walls et al., 2012) .
The present paper wants to contribute to the extant literature by analyzing the relationship between corporate board's structure and firm's environmental proactivity, in order to visualize if some types of directors (non-executive directors, independent directors or female directors) or particular features of the board (size and one tier or two tier system) could act as a stimulating driver for firms' proactive environmental strategies.
Using a sample of European firms belonging to polluting industries that responded to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 2014, this study highlights the importance of a firm's board in the development of companies' proactive environmental conducts, contributing to the understanding of the antecedents of such strategies in several ways.
Firstly, it focuses the attention on the understanding of the relationship between board structure and composition and firms' environmental proactivity, while most of the extant studies examined Finally, as our measure of environmental proactivity covers other countries all over the world, our findings on the relationship between firms' board and PESs may have implications in other countries and could stimulate future comparative analyses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews prior studies on the drivers of firms' proactive environmental strategies and, in particular, the relationship between corporate board structure and environmental proactivity, and it develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and the adopted methodology. Section 4, instead, develops the descriptive statistics and the results of the analysis, together with a formal discussion of the implications of the results. Lastly, in the final part of the paper, the main findings and limitations of the study are summarized.
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND FIRMS' PROACTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The Organizations and the Natural Environmental scholars (Berry and Rondinelli, 1998; Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998) defined proactive environmental strategies (PES) as the reduction of a firm's environmental impact and the management of the relationship between business and nature beyond imposed compliance (Sharma, 2000 ; Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 2003; Gonzales-Benito and GonzalesBenito, 2006). Thus, a firm that adopts a PES is trying to anticipate future regulations and trends, designing and managing new and alternative operations, processes, and products in order to prevent (instead of simply correct) negative environmental impacts (Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 2003) .
A proactive environmental strategy may be ideally seen as the last stage of a firm's environmental efforts (Hunt and Auster, 1990) and it is usually characterized by the presence of four basic elements: (a) regulatory proactivity, (b) operational improvements, (c) organizational changes, and (d) environmental reporting (Delmas et al., 2011) . In other words, a proactive environmental strategy is not just a firm's reaction to regulation, but it implies the adoption of advanced environmental oriented organizational systems and measures in all management decision areas (Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-Benito, 2006). Menguc et al. (2010) defined, in particular, a PES a construct that is composed of two dimensions: pollution prevention and management support of natural environmental issues.
Several studies have recognized that the introduction of environmental proactivity may be used by companies to gain competitive advantage toward competitors, enhancing their position in the market and developing the resources and capabilities in order to build a long-term profit potential (Bansal and (Kock et al., 2012) , the composition of the board of directors (de Villiers et al., 2011) and equity based incentive plans (Kock et al., 2012) .
As regards, in particular, the relation between boards and firms' environmental proactivity, we tried to summarize the most relevant studies on the issue in Table 1 .
As reported in Table 1 , the debate on board structure, composition and ties as potential drivers of firms' environmental issues is still open, with most of the studies focused on Anglo-Saxon countries, in particular U.S. and monitoring the management and aligning its interests to those of shareholders (followed by the agency theorists). Integrating the two perspectives will contribute to a complete understanding of how they may affect firms' proactive environmental strategies and "can help overcome current myopia within the two streams of research" (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003 , p.383). The resource dependence theory (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978 ) views organisations as operating in an open system and needing to exchange and acquire certain resources to survive, creating a dependency between firms and external environment. In this framework, boards are positively seen, as they may provide valuable expertise and capabilities, influence and aid in strategy formulation and help in connecting the firm with stakeholders (Ortiz-de-Mandojana and AragonCorrea, 2013). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) , in particular, asserted that boards may provide four benefits: advice and counseling, legitimacy, channels of communication with the external organizations and preferential access to outside elements.
In this way, larger boards, with a variety of directors, may expand existing board member networks and contacts and help firms to better understand and respond to their stakeholders (Boyd, 1990) , also in case of natural environmental issues. Boards with a high number of members, in fact, are more likely to include experts on specific topics such as environmental issues (de Villiers et al., 2011) , that could provide the expertise to manage green subjects and take advantage of environmental opportunities that may arise.
Therefore, following the results of de Villiers et al. (2011) , that showed how environmental performance tends to be higher in firms with larger boards, we hypothesize that:
H1: Larger boards are positively related to firms' environmental proactivity.
Within the resource dependence theory, diversity in general, and differences in gender in particular may very likely enrich the resources and capabilities of a board, producing unique information available to management for better decision making. The more diverse a board is, the wider the variety of perspectives, the broader the knowledge and expertise, and the greater the access to different networks (Post et al., 2015) .
One considerably debated characteristic of board diversity is gender. Female directors are, in fact, likely to have different educational and professional backgrounds from those of male directors, bringing different perspectives to the board (Hillman et al., 2002) . In addition, women on boards tend to be more democratic and participative in decision-making processes, leading the board to achieve better decisions (Bear et al., 2010) .
A large body of research suggests that women's values are more closely aligned than men's with corporate social responsibility (Zhang et al., 2013 ; Setò-Pamies, 2015) and, as corporate directors, they tend to possess certain psychological characteristics that may make them more sensitive to different stakeholders' claims. According to Ibrahim and Angelidis (1994) , female directors exhibit greater responsibilities: in their analysis, they found that women are more philanthropically driven and less concerned with economic performance. Environmental, ethical, and caring values are likely to affect the decision-making process when women assume the power positions usually held by men (Post et al., 2015) .
Following the studies on CSR, some researchers found out that women have a more protective attitude towards the environment (Wehrmeyer and McNeil, 2000) Following the agency theory framework, the board of directors is an internal control mechanism used to ensure that management behaviour is consistent with the owners' interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Agency theorists, in fact, see the primary function of a board as monitoring the actions of managers (agents) in order to protect the interests of owners (principals). Such monitoring activity is important because of the potential costs that may incur when managers follow their own interests: vigilant directors could effectively reduce such costs, demanding explanations for managers' strategic paths and criticizing not clear initiatives.
A board should not only fulfill its responsibility in monitoring agents and protecting shareholders but also, more importantly, in managing stakeholders. Board's directors may, in fact, exert pressures over managers in order to have strategies and actions that satisfy shareholders (and stakeholders) interests. Therefore, they should be able to influence executive managers to adopt proactive environmental strategies that could help firms to obtain a sustainable competitive advantage. An effective control depends, in particular, on whether the directors are non-executive and independent (professional managers with expertise in monitoring activities, who have incentives to exercise control in order to maintain their reputational capital). Independent directors should be, in fact, primarily interested in aligning with stakeholder interests, being more responsive than insiders to stakeholder pressures, in order to maintain and enhance their reputation and obtain, in this way, new directorships. Moreover, they are more likely to be conscious about how corporate social issues may improve a firm's standing towards investors, government, and lenders ( Board structures are not homogeneous across countries, and, even in the same country, it is possible to adopt different governance systems (Weimer and Pape, 1999) . The company law in many European nations allows, in fact, listed firms to adopt a two-tier board (as opposed to a unitary board) composed of a Management Board and a Supervisory Board. The dual board structure ensures the independence of the two boards by making sure that executives are not too powerful and the Supervisory Board has the duty of protecting stakeholders' interests. Such board, in particular, is usually composed by a different set of stakeholder representatives (employees, banks, other financial institutions, key clients, public officials, and so on), that could also be related to environmental and sustainability issues. Thus, the presence of a two-tier board seems to increase the environmental competencies of the different directors, enhancing firm's commitment to green issues, in comparison to those adopting a one-board system. The Supervisory Board, in fact, could represent an effective instrument for protecting social and environmental issues. Therefore, following the aforementioned argument, we hypothesize that:
H5: The adoption of a two-tier board is positively related with firms' environmental proactivity.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION
In order to test our hypotheses, we explain variations in firms' environmental proactivity using two OLS regression models, where board structure and composition constitute the primary explanatory variables. This methodology has already been used to predict the relationships between several variables and different metrics of environmental engagement or performance (Majumdar and Marcus, 2001 ; Surroca et al., 2010; Habbash, 2015) , so it appears to be an appropriate method of analysis.
Variables' measurement
The measurement of a proactive environmental strategy is always considered a difficult task. The measure is calculated yearly by the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), an independent, not for profit organization that, among other reports, provides environmental and climate change data of worldwide companies and cities through an annual questionnaire.
Such questionnaire covers different topics, such as the emission reduction strategies adopted, technologies, products, processes or services the company develops or applies in response to climate change, the extent to which a company has measured its carbon emissions, and the frequency and relevance of disclosure to key corporate stakeholders.
A CDS smaller than 50 indicates limited or restricted ability to measure and disclose risks and opportunities that come from carbon emissions and environmental concerns. On the contrary, companies with a CDS higher than 70 show a deeper involvement in climate change issues. These companies identify environmental management as a tool for achieving strategic advantage and including climate change-related risks and opportunities into their core business.
We decided to assign the value 0 to the companies that do not have a score as they did not answer to the CDP questionnaire, or asked to not show the results, as a sign of low environmental proactivity.
In particular, we used the company's Carbon Disclosure Score (CDS) 2014, collected from different 2014 CDP climate change reports, as the dependent variable (i.e. firms' environmental proactivity).
As regards, instead, the independent variables related to firms' board structure and composition, we collected the data from the companies' annual reports and corporate governance reports 2013, together with Thomson Reuters Datastream Database. In particular, we considered the percentage of non-executive directors (NON-EX), independent directors (IND) and women (WOM), present in the board. We also considered board size (SIZE), as the total number of directors appointed to the board, and a dummy variable to measure the employed board structure in the firm (CGSYSTEM). The variable assumes value 1 for companies that have a two-tier board and 0 for firms that adopt a one-tier board.
To test the hypotheses we selected a set of control variables, already identified and used in extant literature as relevant drivers for firms' environmental proactivity. These are: the natural logarithm of the firm's annual capitalization (CAP) as a proxy for size (Gonzales-Benito and GonzalesBenito, 2006); company's return on equity (ROE) as, following the slack resources theory, Waddock and Graves (1997) found that higher levels of CSR could be driven by higher financial conditions; company's longevity (LONG), as usually environmental performance and proactivity increase over time (Hass, 1996) and the Carbon Dioxide Emission (CDE) as a proxy of environmental regulatory stringency. Consistent with Kassinin and Vafeas (2006) and Berrone et al. (2010) , it is supposed that country's CO2 emissions are inversely related with regulatory stringency and, as a consequence, with environ-mental performance. The definition and measurement of all the variables used in the analysis are summarized in Table 2 . 
Sample
The sample used in the study consists of the European companies that were included in the Carbon Disclosure Project questionnaire 2014. We decided to focus the attention on the companies that the CDP selected in Switzerland and Austria (168), Italy (100), France (250), Spain and Portugal (125), as the largest in terms of market capitalization, because they all belong to non-Anglo-Saxon corporate governance systems and present comparable ownership and board structures. We in fact intentionally excluded all the companies belonging to countries where the ownership structure and board composition of firms are very specific, as in the case of Germany, in which large companies must follow the principles of the codetermination law in the composition of the twotier boards.
We then selected only the companies operating in pollutant industries that are increasingly facing pressure from stakeholders and media towards better environmental impact. In particular, we considered the firms belonging to the following environmentally sensitive industries: mining, oil, gas, chemicals, paper, iron, steel and other metals, electricity (with the exception of renewable energy producers), gas and water distribution.
Our final sample is therefore composed of 149 firms of different European countries (France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Austria, and Portugal).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In order to test the hypotheses, we used two OLS regression models, where the Carbon Disclosure Score is the explained variable and board structure and characteristics constitute the primary explanatory variables. The Descriptive statistics, frequency and Pearson's correlation coefficients of the variables used in our analysis are presented in Tables 3 and Table 4 . The average value of the Carbon Disclosure Score is 40.9597, with a standard deviation quite high of around 42.46. As regards the independent variables, the average size of the board of directors is 9 members, with a minimum size of 1 director and a maximum of 23 members.
Regarding board composition, the presence of non-executive directors is larger than the independent ones: the average percentage of the first typology in the board is around 67%, while independent directors cover on average 44% of the total board members. Conversely, the presence of women in the board is quite low: only 12.34% of the board positions are, indeed, covered by women. A dual system of corporate governance is instead present in the 14.80% of the sample. Board size presents a high correlation with the other board's characteristics. In particular, the larger is the board, the higher are the percentages of independent (0.375; p-value <0.01), non-executive (0.599; p-value <0.01) and woman (0.276; p-value <0.01) directors in the board and firms' capitalization (0.367; p-value <0.01). Conversely, board size is negatively related to board structure: the size of two-tier boards is significantly smaller (-0.6; p-value <0.01) than one-tier boards systems. Boards of directors with a higher percentage of women are those that have the higher percentage of non-executive directors (0.291; p-value <0.01). The higher presence of non-executive directors is related to two-tier systems (-0.840; p-value <0.01) and to a higher percentage of independent directors (0.706; p-value <0.01).
The Pearson correlations also reveal a significant positive correlation between the Carbon Disclosure Score (CDS) and board size (0.336; pvalue <0.01), the percentage of non-executive directors (0.198; p-value <0.05) and independent directors (0.344; p-value <0.01). The CDS is also positively correlated with capitalization (0.576, pvalue <0.01).
We then investigated the relationship that exists between board structure and composition and firms' environmental proactivity. We, therefore, developed two regression models (Table 5 ): the first model considers only the effect of board characteristics on CDS, while in the second model the control variables are inserted.
Regression results for Model 1 show that consistent with Hypothesis 1, board size (SIZE) has a significant positive impact on CDS, so the higher the number of directors in a board, the higher is the level of environmental proactivity. The result is consistent with the resource dependence theory and with the provisions of de Villiers et al. The result follows the agency theory and provides evidence of the monitoring role of the board. As board's independence increases, the ability of directors to control management's activities towards environmental issues tends to be higher.
The association between firms' PESs and the percentage of women (Hypothesis 2) in the board is instead not significant, even if correctly signed. We, therefore, failed to find any relationship between firms' environmental proactivity and gender diversity of the board (WOM), contrary to extant literature focused on corporate social responsibility (Setò-Pamies, 2013) and environmental performance (Walls et al., 2012; Post et al., 2015) . This is probably due to the low percentage of female directors present in our sample: as reported by Bear et al. (2010) , in fact, the effectiveness of women on boards tends to increase with the addition of female directors: minority voices are not easily expressed or heard in groups.
Our results are also not consistent with Hypothesis 3, as a higher percentage of nonexecutive directors in the board (NON-EX) is not related to a statistically significant increase of firms' environmental proactivity (CDS) and the coefficient is also not correctly signed. This finding does not follow the mainstream literature, like Johnson and Greening (1999) : maybe, non-executive directors are still too closed to management and are not able to fully exploit their monitoring function. Finally, model 1 confirms that two-tier boards (CGSYST) are positively associated with CDS: the presence of a Supervisory Board is probably enhancing the protection of stakeholders' interests, also regarding environmental issues, leading the management to higher levels of environmental proactivity. When control variables have been inserted (model 2) the regression fit increased (Adjusted RSquared = 0.376). Among control variables, just firm's capitalization, considered as a proxy of company's size (CAP =10.508), positively affects firm's environmental proactivity. However, the introduction of control variables reduces the effect of board structure and composition on CDS. In model 2, the positive and significant coefficients related to the percentage of board size (SIZE) and independent directors (IND) decrease in value, while the variable "board system" (CGSYST) becomes nonsignificant. It means that firm's size, longevity, profitability and environmental regulatory stringency seem to primarily affect company's environmental proactivity, partially neutralising the pressure exerted by the board.
CONCLUSIONS
The present paper addresses the nature and intensity of the relations existing between board structure and composition and firms' environmental proactivity.
In this regard, founding on agency theory and resource dependence theory assumptions, the manuscript investigates the role of board size, board composition (percentage of women, non-executive, and independent directors) and structure (two-tier or one-tier board) in affecting the proactive orientation towards environmental issues of a sample of non-Anglo-Saxon European firms belonging to pollutant industries. Indeed, the results of the two OLS regression models provide evidence that boards do affect firms' PES. Our main findings suggest a positive relationship between board size or the presence of independent directors in the board and companies' environmental proactivity, measured by the Carbon Disclosure Score 2014; while the percentage of women and non-executive directors, together with the structure of the board (one-tier or two-tier board system), do not seem to be related to firms' proactive environmental strategies.
Our study presents some limitations that may be ironed out in future studies. The first limitation is related to the measurement of firms' environmental proactivity. We used the Carbon Disclosure Score generated by a voluntary self-reporting process (CDP). This is a reliable index, but it may lead to including in the analysis mainly companies that are already biased towards environmental proactivity and who may want to report it. Moreover, including in the sample non-respondent companies and firms that asked to not show their results with a CDS of 0, could raise problems regarding the continuous nature of CDS; future studies should evaluate the possibility to convert CDS in a categorical variable.
Finally, we investigated firms' environmental proactivity in a quite specific context: namely polluting industries operating in developed economies, that have both a strong environmental regulation and environmentally conscious consumers.
Despite such limitations, however, this contribution provides some valuable research implications, useful for researchers and academics, but also for managers and public authorities, as the results allow to identify the characteristics of the board that may foster and enforce firms' environmental proactivity, as a mean for reaching sustainability. Companies, in fact, may play a significant role in the reduction of man activities' impact on natural environment and in the promotion of a more ecologically sustainable world.
Moreover, socially responsible funds could find useful, for their portfolio allocation strategy, to know if there are types of more oriented to green issue.
